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COURT PROPERTY DECISIONS 
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In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection,1 the U.S. Supreme Court divided over the 
question whether takings alleged to have occurred as a result of 
judicial action should be treated identically to takings by legislative or 
executive actors. In this essay, we accept the plurality’s basic 
contention that it makes little sense to treat judicial takings of 
property categorically differently than takings by other branches of 
government. If a judge decided to condemn property for a highway 
project, for example, we agree with Justice Scalia that the Constitution 
would compel compensation, just as it does when the legislature or 
executive takes private property for the benefit of the public. 
Beyond the prototypical example of condemnation, however, the 
notion of judicial takings raises a whole new set of complications. 
Given the incremental and case-specific nature of common-law 
development, property rules evolve and morph in ways that are 
continually shifting the rights and responsibilities of property owners, 
their neighbors, and the public. If every decision effecting such a shift 
triggered a takings claim by the losing party, it would not only clog the 
court system and burden the public fisc, but also undermine the 
system of common-law rulemaking that has long dominated property 
law development. Such fears might appear far-fetched under the 
historically narrow definition of takings. As the Supreme Court 
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 1. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
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broadens the type of governmental action that can constitute a taking, 
however, it becomes more and more plausible to contend that run-of-
the-mill common-law decisions by state courts could trigger federal 
court scrutiny under the Takings Clause. Any judicial decision 
addressing new facts could be characterized as a “change” in the law 
and thus a taking of property from the non-prevailing party. 
Beyond its general threat to common-law evolution, moreover, 
the specter of judicial takings raises a related but distinct concern 
about the ability of state courts to interpret the meaning of state-law 
property doctrines. Stop the Beach Renourishment aptly illustrates this 
point. The Supreme Court of Florida declared that, under Florida law, 
sand dumped by the government to prevent erosion constituted an 
“avulsion” whereby ownership accrued to the state.2 The property 
owners, displeased with the Florida court’s interpretation of Florida 
law, asked the federal courts to intervene. They sought a declaration 
that the Florida Supreme Court had misinterpreted prior Florida law, 
such that its current ruling (treating the sand dump as an avulsion) 
changed the law and amounted to a judicial taking.3 
This sort of claim raises difficult questions about what standard of 
review a federal court should apply in deciding whether a state court’s 
decision on a question of state property law has effectively deprived a 
property holder of preexisting rights. This issue is particularly salient 
because judicial takings theories have the potential to transform 
mistakes of state law into federal constitutional violations. A similar 
dynamic occurs in a number of other areas. Under the Contracts 
Clause,4 for example, a state court’s interpretation of what counts as a 
binding contract under state law may amount to an “impairment” that 
violates the federal constitution if it departs from settled state 
principles of contract law.5 In Bush v. Gore,6 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurring opinion argued that a state court’s interpretation of state 
election law could, if it departed from preexisting state law principles, 
violate Article II’s prescription that states conduct presidential 
 
 2. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117–18 (Fla. 
2008). 
 3. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (finding that state 
law created a contractual right, notwithstanding the state supreme court’s conclusion that the 
right was not contractual in nature, and that subsequent state legislation unconstitutionally 
impaired the contract). 
 6. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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elections in the “manner directed” by the state legislature.7 And in 
international law, a “denial of justice” occurs when a domestic court 
misconstrues domestic law in a way that harms a foreign national; 
supranational tribunals may thus review domestic courts’ construction 
of their own law in order to assess whether justice has been denied.8 
Experience in each of these areas suggests that federal courts 
considering judicial takings claims must proceed with caution and 
deference if we are to avoid enabling widespread collateral attacks on 
state judgments and preserve the supremacy of state courts in 
interpreting state law. 
The Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality suggested at least 
some degree of deference to state courts’ construction of state 
property law by saying that courts “take” property only if their 
decisions depart from “established” rights.9 This language suggests a 
further set of analogies to qualified immunity and habeas corpus law, 
which also require courts to assess whether a principle of law is 
“clearly established” or “new.”10 The jurisprudence in these areas is 
hardly a model of clarity, but the problems it grapples with are 
inevitable once courts acknowledge—as they must—that judges 
sometimes make and change the law rather than merely apply it. At a 
minimum, any court prepared to recognize a judicial taking must 
come to grips with the difficult question of distinguishing between 
“new” and “established” constructions of state law; that question, we 
suggest, should be approached with a strong dose of deference to the 
state courts. 
We would go further, however, and largely rule out recognition of 
judicial takings except in the relatively rare circumstance in which a 
state’s highest court acknowledges that it has departed from 
preexisting law. Under the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Murdock v. Memphis,11 state courts ordinarily have the last word on 
matters of state law; the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
state-law questions on appeal from the state courts, even if the case is 
 
 7. Id. at 112–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 8. See generally Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1172, 1189 (2005) (discussing this phenomenon). 
 9. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010). 
 10. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that new constitutional rules 
should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of state criminal convictions); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that executive officials generally have qualified 
immunity barring liability unless their actions violate “clearly established” law). 
 11. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
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otherwise within the Court’s jurisdiction because it also presents a 
federal question.12 Although a limited exception to the Murdock rule 
exists for state-law questions antecedent to a question of federal right, 
the instances in which the Supreme Court reviews such questions are 
rare. The Court engages in such review, moreover, only when strong 
federal interests are present and the Court has particular reasons to 
doubt the competence or good faith of the state courts. These 
rationales do not justify federal review whenever a losing property 
claimant wishes to argue that a state court “changed” state property 
law by misconstruing it. There is simply no reason to think that a 
federal reviewing court is more likely to arrive at the “right answer” 
under state property law than was the state court in the first instance. 
Given the high costs of federalizing state property decisions, we 
would simply foreclose such review entirely.13 
I. JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 
At first glance, it seems logical to conclude that the Takings Clause 
applies to any government action that takes “private property . . . for 
public use, without just compensation.”14 The language of the Takings 
Clause gives no reason to distinguish between legislatures, executives, 
and courts, leaving the logical implication that any of these state 
actors can commit an unconstitutional taking by depriving individuals 
of private property rights, for public purposes, without adequate 
compensation. Although at least one commentator has suggested that 
this textual argument is “some sort of faux formalism,”15 we think this 
premise makes good sense. If a state could avoid paying just 
compensation by transferring its condemnation authority to the 
courts, that would invite a fairly obvious end run around the Takings 
Clause. Indeed, constitutional doctrine has avoided similar end run 
problems by extending the First Amendment to all government actors, 
 
 12. Id. at 635–36. 
 13. As we discuss infra Part III, claims that a federal court decision has “taken” federal 
property rights—e.g., by altering preexisting patent, copyright, or trademark law—raise 
somewhat different issues. While this sort of takings claim avoids federalism concerns, it 
demonstrates the potential breadth (and danger) of a broad judicial takings doctrine that finds a 
taking any time a judicial decision defies the expectations of property owners. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 236 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Takings Clause against the states). 
 15. J. Peter Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, ECOLOGY L.Q., 2 (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823709; see also id. at 4 (declaring generously that 
“the plurality’s textual argument is so much lipstick on a pig”). 
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even though the text is explicitly limited to “Congress.”16 
We suspect that the difficult question is not so much whether 
courts, as opposed to legislatures or executive actors, are ever subject 
to the Takings Clause, but rather whether that clause applies to a 
particular form of judicial action—the traditional development of the 
common law of property. Even critics of the plurality’s judicial takings 
doctrine would surely apply the Takings Clause to a court that had 
been expressly delegated the state’s power of eminent domain. If that 
is right, then the focus should not be so much on which branch of 
government is acting, as a purely formal matter, but on what the 
government is actually doing. Two aspects of the judicial action at 
issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment—a state court’s interpretation 
of state property law—make it a particularly troublesome judicial 
takings candidate. First, when a state court construes and limits the 
scope of property rights, that process will generally be more akin to 
the type of regulatory action that falls within the Supreme Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence than to classic exercises of eminent 
domain. Second, the inherently evolutionary nature of common-law 
decision-making makes it difficult to determine when a court has 
altered state property law sufficiently to trigger a takings analysis. 
Some criticisms of judicial takings seem grounded ultimately in an 
objection to regulatory takings jurisprudence in general, regardless of 
the branch to which that jurisprudence is applied.17 In part to keep the 
peace among co-authors, we do not go so far. Our point is simply that 
the expansion of the Court’s takings jurisprudence beyond the 
confines of eminent domain raises the stakes for a debate about 
judicial takings. Takings now include minor physical invasions from 
things like cable wires,18 regulatory restrictions on the appropriate use 
of the property,19 and even economic regulations that a reviewing 
court deems insufficiently “just[]” and “fair[]” in light of the 
 
 16. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) 
(invalidating a judicial injunction against publication of the “Pentagon Papers” under the First 
Amendment); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1456 
(1990) (“The Supreme Court has unhesitatingly extended most of the noneconomic restrictions 
of the Constitution to judicial actions, even in the face of express constitutional language to the 
contrary.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing that “the kind of rigid per se regulatory 
takings rule favored by the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality should not apply to either 
legislative or judicial decisions”). 
 18. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). 
 19. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 413–14 (1922). 
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investment-backed expectation of the aggrieved party.20 Takings, in 
other words, can result from virtually any governmental action or rule 
change that unduly burdens a party’s interest in real property, 
personal property, or money for the benefit of the public.21 The 
immediate benefit, moreover, need not accrue to the public at large, 
but can go to a private party.22 Of course, burden alone does not 
establish a taking; the burdened party must prove, to the court’s 
satisfaction, that the burden was unjust and unfair.23 As the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged, however, this is an “essentially ad hoc and 
fact intensive” inquiry that turns on a series of highly subjective 
factors: “‘the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action.’”24  
The expansion of the type of property “losses” that can constitute 
a taking may not go directly to the question of whether to treat judges 
differently than other governmental actors, but it certainly affects the 
practical import of a decision that judges can take. The fact that even 
purely monetary transfers can constitute a taking has created a 
convergence between the constitutional notion of a “taking” and the 
everyday business of common-law courts. Courts routinely decide 
cases presenting new facts, and they sometimes decide them in 
surprising ways. Sometimes those decisions defy the expectations of 
 
 20. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523–24 (1998); cf. id. at 553 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me that the plurality and Justice Kennedy have substituted their 
judgment about what is fair for the better informed judgment of the members of the Coal 
Commission and Congress.”). 
 21. Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (contending 
that purely economic regulation should be evaluated under the Due Process Clause rather than 
the Takings Clause, which should apply only when “a specific property right or interest [is] at 
stake”). 
 22. Id.; cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485, 489–90 (2005) (holding that an 
economic redevelopment plan falls within the “public use” requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment, even when private parties receive much of the direct benefit from the plan). 
 23. See Apfel, 524 U.S. at 523–24 (“‘[T]he determination whether justice and fairness 
require that economic injuries caused by public action [must] be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons,’ is 
essentially ad hoc and fact intensive. We have identified several factors, however, that have 
particular significance: ‘[T]he economic impact of the regulation, its interference with 
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.’” 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979))). Courts dispense with this 
requirement of proving an unfair and unjust burden when the taking involves a permanent 
physical occupation of the party’s property, see Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, or when a regulation 
denies the property owner all “economically viable uses of his land,” see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1019. 
 24. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 523–24 (quoting Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 175). 
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parties and result in one party having to bear an unanticipated cost. If 
each damage assessment or injunction in such cases were open to a 
Takings Clause challenge, it would not only burden the federal 
judiciary, but would chill the process of common-law decision-
making.25 Given the breadth of property interests that can trigger 
takings claims, there is no reason to believe that a broad judicial 
takings rule would limit itself to property law; any change in tort or 
other state laws that resulted in unanticipated burdens on one party 
could invite Takings Clause challenges as well.26 
Advocates of the judicial takings doctrine dismiss these concerns, 
contending that common-law courts have no greater right than 
legislatures to change the rules in a way that appropriates or 
impermissibly burdens established private property rights.27 Accepting 
the logic of that argument, however, brings us to our second and more 
difficult question: how should a federal court evaluate whether a 
court has changed the rules to an extent that could constitute a 
taking? Arguably, every case presenting new facts results in some 
minor “change” in the law, regardless of how slight the change in 
circumstances. The common law is simply the cumulative body of 
years of such experience. It grows and evolves organically, sometimes 
in unpredictable ways. A court may unwittingly adopt standards in 
one case that fit poorly with a different and unanticipated set of facts. 
When that new set of facts presents itself, the court may retreat from 
its broad ruling and revise its legal standards to better suit the new 
circumstances. 
Take nuisance law. For years many states, including New York, 
granted automatic injunctions in nuisance suits, regardless of the 
economic consequences, if a neighboring property owner could show 
that it was suffering damages that were not “insubstantial.”28 In 1970, 
in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company,29 the New York Court of 
Appeals abandoned this long-standing rule in favor of one that 
 
 25. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
247, 248 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/2/18/mulvaney.html (worrying that a broad 
judicial takings doctrine “could serve to chill the ordinary operation of the common law system 
as responsive to changing conditions”). 
 26. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism 
and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 283 (1988) (proposing that the Takings 
Clause applies to states’ claims of sovereign immunity in tort suits, “insofar as they bar recovery 
when private parties would be liable for similar conduct”). 
 27. Thompson, supra note 16, at 1509–10. 
 28. E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 805–06 (N.Y. 1913). 
 29. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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balanced costs and benefits, allowing nuisances to continue when the 
underlying activity brought dramatically more benefit than harm.30 
This shift reflected a significant change in the legal entitlements of 
property owners living near a nuisance. Given the increasing pressure 
on state courts to balance costs and benefits in crafting nuisance rules, 
such a shift may have been predictable. But it clearly represented a 
departure from prior rulings that reallocated benefits and burdens 
among neighboring landowners.31 Should such a departure constitute 
a taking, which would entitle every property owner living near a 
nuisance to claim compensation from the state, in addition to actual 
damages for their injuries, because the court reordered the remedies 
available to them? 
We are skeptical, based on prudential, historical, and federalism 
concerns. We have already suggested some of the practical concerns. 
After all, finding takings from decisions like Boomer would at best 
discourage, and at worst preclude, judicial innovation. If every change 
in the law threatened takings liability, courts would be deterred from 
adapting the law to meet new circumstances and learning from their 
mistakes. 
From a historical perspective, it strikes us as odd to suddenly 
define as a taking the kind of common-law evolution that was 
occurring before, during, and after the adoption of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, but was never thought to raise Takings 
Clause concerns. The U.S. Supreme Court has not traditionally viewed 
state decisions altering state law as constitutionally problematic. In 
1930, for instance, the Court reasoned that “[s]tate courts, like this 
Court, may ordinarily overrule their own decisions without offending 
constitutional guaranties, even though parties may have acted to their 
prejudice on the faith of the earlier decisions.”32 And even Justice 
Scalia conceded in Stop the Beach Renourishment that the Framers 
“doubtless did not” expect the Takings Clause “would apply to 
judicial action.”33 
 
 30. Id. at 875. 
 31. Before Boomer, the threat of an injunction gave those living near a nuisance a valuable 
economic tool in negotiations with the perpetrator of the nuisance; they could hold out and 
demand a share of the profits associated with the nuisance in exchange for allowing the nuisance 
to continue, even when such payment substantially exceeded the damages that they suffered 
from the nuisance. After Boomer, neighbors who lived near a nuisance whose overall benefits 
exceeded its harms were limited to receiving actual damages. 
 32. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 n.8 (1930). 
 33. 130 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
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The historical debate raises a difficult problem of translation:34 On 
the one hand, it is too simplistic to say, as Justice Scalia did, that “the 
Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to judicial 
action” because “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts 
had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”35 As Professor Peter 
Byrne points out, “English common law underwent dramatic 
modernization in the Eighteenth Century, and American courts after 
independence immediately adopted English common law to suit 
American circumstances.”36 On the other hand, it is also “nonsense as 
a matter of legal history”—to borrow Professor Byrne’s phrase37—to 
suggest that nothing has changed in our conception of the lawmaking 
role of courts in the wake of Legal Realism (not to mention Law and 
Economics and Critical Legal Studies). The last century has put a 
great deal of pressure on categorical distinctions between law and 
politics or courts and legislatures. If it is to perform its historical 
function of protecting property holders against deprivations by 
government, the Takings Clause must reflect these changes. But at the 
same time, it should not be construed to foreclose the sort of 
common-law evolution that the Framers valued and that we still rely 
upon today.  
Advocates of judicial takings have two responses to these 
concerns about disrupting the development of the common law. First, 
they say that the worry about deterring innovation is not unique to 
judges and that legislatures, too, must take the Takings Clause into 
account in considering new legal rules.38 At least one of us views this 
as a reason for concern about the expansion of the takings doctrine 
generally, and we see little reason to compound these concerns by 
extending the takings doctrine to judges. Because they generally act 
incrementally and in the context of specific factual disputes, we think 
courts bring particular institutional advantages to the process of legal 
change.39 These specific advantages both ease some of the more 
 
 34. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
 35. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 36. Byrne, supra note 15, at 4. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 16, at 1499–1509 (asserting that legislatures are very 
conscious of takings issues due to budgetary concerns). 
 39. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 678–81 (1994) (discussing the institutional 
virtues of judicial decision-making); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 32 (1962) (emphasizing the courts’ 
concern for continuity in their approach to legal change). 
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persuasive concerns about takings and make us particularly unwilling 
to deter judicial innovation. 
In theory, constitutional doctrine might preserve the virtues of 
evolutionary judicial innovation while still compensating property 
holders on the receiving end of more dramatic changes, even when 
those changes occur at the hands of courts. The second response of 
judicial takings advocates is thus to interpret judicial takings narrowly, 
to apply only to “substantial” departures from precedent.40 It is not 
clear that this narrower form of judicial takings doctrine is what the 
Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality had in mind. When Justice 
Scalia said that “[o]ur precedents provide no support for the 
proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to 
special treatment,”41 he seemed to leave little room to acknowledge 
the institutional differences between legislatures and courts or the 
traditional evolutionary processes of the common law. In contrast, in 
response to Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia allowed that “[i]f no 
‘settled principl[e]’ has been abandoned, it is hard to see how 
property law could have been ‘change[d],’ rather than merely 
clarified.”42 We suspect that some such qualification will be essential if 
the judicial takings position is ever to move from a plurality opinion 
to a majority holding. 
A final set of concerns, however, leaves us skeptical as to whether 
even a more limited judicial takings doctrine is worth the institutional 
costs that it might incur. Even a doctrine limited to “substantial 
departures from precedent” would invite messy federal-court line-
drawing over exactly how much property a state court could take if a 
state court could take property.43 Any form of federal judicial review 
of state-court property decisions will implicate serious federalism 
concerns, regardless of the standard under which such review is 
conducted. 
The federalism-based objection to a judicial takings doctrine rests 
on a particular view of the source of property rights. In our view, state 
courts define state property law (at least when the state legislature 
 
 40. See, e.g., id. 
 41. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion). 
 42. Id. at 2606–07. Likewise, we suspect that there is enough play in the joints of what 
counts as an “established” property right to resist other commentators’ characterization of the 
plurality opinion as adopting a “per se rule.” See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 15. 
 43. Cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion) (comparing 
Justice Breyer’s hypothetical analysis of the takings claim to “the perplexing question how much 
wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood”). 
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does not intervene). Property rights thus do not come from the 
federal Constitution or some a priori conception of property—they 
are whatever the relevant state authorities, usually courts, say they 
are.44 While we think this is the dominant view, in contemporary 
jurisprudence, it is not entirely uncontroversial.45 But it grounds our 
view that allowing federal courts to review every allegation that a 
state court has changed state property law would undermine the state 
courts’ control of state law. 
Professor Barton Thompson describes this “positivist” view of 
state property law as inevitably indeterminate, leaving state courts 
free to avoid takings claims by simply declaring that property is 
whatever they say it is.46 The alternative, however, requires the 
adoption of a normative federal vision of “property”—property, 
under this approach, is whatever federal courts say it is in interpreting 
the Constitution. That, as we have suggested, would run counter to 
traditional understandings of the relation between state and federal 
law in this important area; it would also amount to a significant 
extension of federal authority.47 
Professor Thompson advocates an expectations-oriented 
approach, which would declare an interest to be property if prior 
statutes and judicial decisions gave the owner a reasonable basis for 
believing that her ownership was established and secure.48 This 
approach cannot avoid embroiling federal courts in an inquiry into 
the reasonableness and certainty of expectations based on state 
property law. It also reflects a normative vision of a background set of 
federal rights and entitlements that go along with property 
 
 44. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some 
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified . . . .”). 
 45. Compare, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, 
of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 487 
(6th ed. 2009) (hereinafter “HART & WECHSLER”) (“The cases take the view that, in general, 
the question whether a ‘property’ interest exists is governed by state law.”), with Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may 
not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . .”). 
 46. Thompson, supra note 16, at 1527. 
 47. Cf. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond 
Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738 (1975) (recounting how the federal courts extended their powers vis-
à-vis state courts by employing their own normative views of common-law rights to supplant 
state law). 
 48. Thompson, supra note 16, at 1538–41. 
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ownership.49 In our view, federal courts should stay out of the business 
of assessing the certainty and predictability of state common law; we 
think it unwise to move toward such a normative federal notion of 
property. 
There may well be circumstances in which a state court decides, 
because of changed circumstances or patently normative reasons, to 
abandon a clearly defined property rule to which it had adhered for 
many years. Even in such a situation, we see good reason for caution 
in invoking the Takings Clause because of our worry about deterring 
judicial innovation. It would make good sense, for example, to decide 
that takings law simply cannot apply to a judicial decision unless the 
decision appropriates private property for the benefit of the general 
public. When a judicial decision changes the law in a way that satisfies 
this classic notion of a taking, however, we agree with Justice Scalia 
that a judicial taking can occur. Otherwise, we think federal courts 
should take state courts at their word and find no taking when a court 
applies the law to new facts, regardless of the expectations of the 
parties. 
II. JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND STATE COURTS’ CONTROL OF STATE 
LAW 
The positivist view of property that we advocated in the preceding 
part makes property rights entirely a creature of the common or 
statutory law that creates them. This law will generally (although not 
always50) be state law. A primary reason for rejecting a broad doctrine 
of judicial takings thus sounds in federalism: federal court review of 
state property decisions in order to identify and remedy 
uncompensated judicial takings would interfere with the state courts’ 
control of their own law. This Part develops the principle that state 
courts are the boss of state law; although we discuss areas in which the 
law departs from that principle, we suggest that those departures 
should be kept to a minimum. 
 
 49. Professor Thompson acknowledges this point, but views it as inevitable if the Takings 
clause is to achieve its normative goals. See id. at 1541 (“An expectations approach . . . is not 
adequate by itself to delineate constitutional property. The Court must supplement it with some 
normative view of property . . . .”). 
 50. We discuss judicial takings of federally-created property rights in Part III, infra. 
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A. The Murdock Rule 
In Murdock v. City of Memphis,51 the Supreme Court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review a state supreme court’s construction of 
state law. Murdock involved a direct appeal from a state supreme 
court that raised issues of both state and federal law; although the U.S. 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the federal questions in the 
case, the Court rejected the notion that once it had jurisdiction over 
the case itself, it could decide all the issues—both federal and state—
necessary to reach a final judgment.52 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction over appeals from the state courts, Murdock said, “has 
been based upon the fundamental principle that this jurisdiction was 
limited to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal law.”53 
Accordingly,  
[t]he State courts are the appropriate tribunals . . . for the decision 
of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or 
otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress acted 
upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of 
their ability to construe those laws correctly.54  
As one of us always tells his Federal Courts students, that’s why they 
call them the state supreme courts.55 
The Murdock Court purported to rest on a construction of the 
1867 Judiciary Act, which amended the 1789 Judiciary Act’s provision 
for Supreme Court review of state-court decisions;56 the Court 
avoided deciding “whether, if Congress had conferred such authority 
[to review state courts’ decision of state-law questions], the act would 
have been constitutional.”57 But the Murdock rule has assumed a 
quasi-constitutional status on account of the role that it plays in our 
federalism. Professor Martha Field has thus explained that if the 
federal Supreme Court were allowed to substitute its own view of 
state law for that of the highest state court, “it would not be possible 
to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It is thus because of 
Murdock that the whole concept of state law as distinct from federal 
 
 51. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 52. Id. at 621–22. 
 53. Id. at 630. 
 54. Id. at 626. 
 55. Except of course in New York, where the “supreme courts” are trial courts, subject to 
reversal by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals. Go figure. 
 56. The current provision is 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West 2011). 
 57. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 633. 
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law is a meaningful one.”58 
The debate about judicial takings reflects a tension between 
Murdock’s principle that state courts are the boss of state law (at least 
vis-à-vis federal courts) and the structure of certain federal 
guarantees, which do not specify the content of state law but forbid 
certain kinds of changes to that law. The Contracts Clause, for 
example, relies on state law to define the scope of contract rights, but 
forbids state actors to “impair the obligation” of those rights.59 The 
Takings Clause requires just compensation when property is taken for 
public use, but leaves the definition of the underlying property rights 
primarily to state law.60 In effect, both clauses allow the states to 
define property and contract rights as they will, but forbid the states 
to change those rights in a way that abrogates vested rights. This 
arrangement has produced an uneasy situation in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has asserted a limited right of review over state-court 
decisions on state-law issues in order to ensure that the related 
federal rights are respected. 
The early case of Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee61 provides an 
instructive example of this limited right of review. Fairfax’s Devisee 
was a prequel to the Marshall Court’s more famous decision in Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee,62 which affirmed the Supreme Court’s power to 
review state-court decisions on federal issues. The State of Virginia 
had seized land belonging to Denny Martin Fairfax, a British subject, 
during the Revolutionary War. The State ultimately granted the land 
to Hunter. Under the treaties that ended the war, seizures that 
occurred before a certain date would be honored, but seizures after 
the effective date would not. Fairfax’s right to the land—a federal 
right under the treaty—thus depended on the effective date of the 
seizure, a question of state law. The Virginia Court of Appeals 
determined that the seizure took place before the effective date, but 
the U.S. Supreme Court—worried that the state courts were hostile to 
British subjects in general and these sorts of treaty rights in 
 
 58. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 883, 922 (1986). Professor Field points out that, despite Murdock’s avowed reliance on 
statutory construction, its rule has become “such a fundamental part of our way of thinking 
about the boundary between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, 
constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.” Id. at 920. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 60. Some property rights, such as patents, are created under federal law. But even here, 
those rights are not created by the Constitution itself. 
 61. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). 
 62. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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particular—reviewed that decision and reversed.63 As the authors of 
the Hart and Wechsler casebook explain, Fairfax’s Devisee stands for 
the proposition that “where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent 
for determining whether a federal right has been violated, some 
review of the basis for the state court’s determination of the state-law 
question is essential if the federal right is to be protected against 
evasion and discrimination.”64 
Federal review of state-law issues that are antecedent to a 
determination of federal rights thus stands as an important exception 
to the Murdock rule. In Fairfax’s Devisee, federal review involved a 
narrow category of state law—the effective date of revolutionary land 
seizures—and a narrow set of federal rights that the Court had good 
reason to think were the subject of unique hostility in the relevant 
state.65 Judicial takings, on the other hand, threaten to create a much 
broader exception. In principle, any state judicial decision that departs 
from prior law “changes” that law, and if that change works to the 
detriment of a property holder, it may be construed as a taking. That 
means that the correctness of any state-court ruling on property rights 
is antecedent to the property holder’s federal right of just 
compensation. It is hard to see how any disappointed property holder 
would not have colorable grounds to bring any state property ruling 
within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court—or possibly induce 
a lower federal court to hear a collateral attack on the state court’s 
ruling—simply by relabeling a putative error of state law as a judicial 
taking. 
We do not think this is a promising model for federal-state judicial 
relations. The next section discusses analogous situations in which 
federal courts or international tribunals have engaged in review of 
state-court decisions on state law. It also considers possible options 
for mitigating the effect of such review drawn from other areas of 
federal courts law. We conclude that federal courts should engage in 
such review as infrequently as possible. 
B. Murdock’s Exceptions: Federal and International Review of State-
Court Decisions on State-Law Issues 
Notwithstanding Murdock, federal courts review state-court 
constructions of state law in a number of contexts in which they deem 
 
 63. Fairfax, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 626–28. 
 64. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 458. 
 65. Fairfax, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 608–10. 
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such review necessary to protect federal rights.66 The examples most 
structurally similar to the Takings Clause occur under the Contracts 
Clause, which forbids state “Law[s] impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”67 Because federal law generally does not define 
contractual rights, the existence of the underlying contract in 
Contracts Clause cases is a matter of state law. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has held that, “in order that the constitutional 
mandate may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for 
ourselves whether a contract was made, [and] what are its terms and 
conditions” as a predicate to determining “whether the State has, by 
later legislation, impaired its obligation.”68 This inquiry “involves an 
appraisal of the statutes of the State and the decisions of its courts.”69 
The Contracts Clause cases pay their respects to Murdock, 
however, by according considerable deference to the state courts’ 
interpretation of state law. In Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, the 
Court said that “we accord respectful consideration and great weight 
to the views of the state’s highest court.”70 Other cases have gone 
further—rhetorically at least—and insisted that  
“if there is no evasion of the constitutional issue . . . and the 
nonfederal ground of decision has fair support . . . this Court will 
not inquire whether the rule applied by the state court is right or 
wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed the 
better rule for that of the state court.”71  
It is not altogether clear that the different formulations one 
encounters in the opinions make a great deal of difference in practice; 
we have very few cases on the issue, in part because when the Court 
decides to leave a state court’s construction of state law undisturbed, 
 
 66. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court 
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1919 (2003) 
(proposing that “the Supreme Court has ancillary jurisdiction to review state-court 
determinations of state law in cases where the Constitution or federal law imposes a duty of 
fidelity to prior state law . . . and the claim is that the state court materially and impermissibly 
departed from that law at a later point in time”); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: 
Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 89 (2002) 
(arguing that, in order to conduct such review, “the Court should have to rebut its own 
presumption that state courts can be trusted to self-enforce their supremacy clause obligations 
when applying state law”). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 68. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). 
 69. Id.; see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 485–86. 
 70. Brand, 303 U.S. at 100. 
 71. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (quoting Broad River 
Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930)). 
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it typically denies certiorari because it lacks jurisdiction under the 
adequate and independent state-grounds doctrine. Such an action will 
generally occur without comment by the Court—hence the dearth of 
decisions fleshing out the relevant standard of review.72 But even the 
few cases we do have make clear that the Supreme Court owes an 
obligation of deference to state-court constructions of state law even 
when they are antecedent to a question of federal right. 
Professor Henry Monaghan has argued that “the fair support rule 
should be viewed as a rule of practice only,” and that “the Court 
possesses ancillary jurisdiction independently to determine the 
content of state law whenever the Federal Constitution directly 
constrains its operation or incorporates it.”73 But it is unclear where 
this “ancillary” jurisdiction comes from. Murdock interpreted the 
state-law questions arising in federal question cases as falling outside 
the Court’s statutory jurisdiction,74 and Congress has never enacted an 
ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction statute for the Supreme Court 
as it has for the federal district courts. Any attempt by the Supreme 
Court to overrule a state court on a question of state law would raise 
the constitutional difficulties that Murdock avoided. It is thus the 
Court’s jurisdiction to review antecedent state-law questions at all 
that rests on a shaky foundation—not the “fair support” rule. That 
jurisdiction, if it can be justified at all, rests on the fear that state 
courts are not simply deciding their own law incorrectly, but rather 
are deliberately manipulating it in order to avoid federal rights. 
Something more than a mistaken construction on a close question is 
thus required in order to support federal intervention. 
The Contracts Clause may be largely ancient history, but the 
problem of federal review of state-law issues antecedent to federal 
rights persists. A particularly dramatic instance is then-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush v. Gore.75 Article II provides that 
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors.”76 The Chief Justice, joined by 
 
 72. These issues of case posture also mean that the Supreme Court typically will have 
occasion to issue an opinion only in the rare subset of cases in which it decides to override the 
state court’s construction of state law. The opinions we have, in other words, may well be 
unrepresentative of the Court’s general approach to state-court constructions of state law. The 
more important indicator is the infrequency with which the Court engages in such review at all. 
 73. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 1964 (emphasis added). 
 74. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874). 
 75. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, read this language to impose a federal 
nondelegation principle of sorts on state election law: state 
legislatures must “direct” the process for appointing presidential 
electors, rather than abdicating that responsibility to other branches 
of state government.77 Although the state courts might ordinarily 
enjoy broad authority to fill gaps in state law, the Chief Justice argued 
that this authority is circumscribed in the context of a presidential 
election.78 The concurring justices thus had to review the Florida 
Supreme Court’s construction of state election law to determine 
whether that court had departed so far from the statutory framework 
as to engage in forbidden judicial lawmaking.79 
As in the Contract Clause cases, the Bush v. Gore concurrence 
accorded a degree of deference to the state court’s construction of 
state law. The Chief Justice wrote that the Court should “undertake an 
independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law.”80 He warned, 
however, that too much deference would undermine “the 
constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach 
definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the 
very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from 
the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to 
enforce the explicit requirements of Article II.”81 
If anything, Bush v. Gore helps make the case for considerably 
greater deference to state courts in the context of judicial takings. It is 
hard to think of any contexts in which the federal interest in a correct 
construction of state law is greater than with respect to a national 
presidential election. Equally important, the Bush v. Gore 
concurrence’s actual analysis of state law poses something of a 
cautionary tale. Florida’s law concerning recounts in contested 
elections was intricate and murky, and although one can make a case 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reading of it was more persuasive than 
the Florida Supreme Court’s, that case is hardly beyond dispute.82 
 
 77. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 78. Id. at 112–20. 
 79. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 490–94 (discussing the federal 
review of state courts issue in Bush v. Gore). 
 80. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 115. 
 82. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the 
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23–40 (concluding that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision was indefensible), with Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the 
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407–08 (2001) (criticizing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s reversal of the Florida Supreme Court). 
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When in doubt on such a question, one might sensibly prefer the 
reading of a state supreme court based simply on its greater 
familiarity with state law in general and state election rules in 
particular. The failure of the Bush v. Gore concurrence to attract a 
majority of the Court or to win acceptance in the broader legal 
community suggests that it is hardly a model for federal-state judicial 
relations.83 
Federal courts are not the only tribunals that review state-court 
constructions of state law; in recent years, such review has increasingly 
been undertaken by supranational tribunals adjudicating “denial of 
justice” claims under international law. In such cases, an international 
tribunal effectively reviews a domestic court’s decision to determine 
whether the domestic court has violated international law by treating 
a foreign party to a suit unfairly—and “unfair treatment” may include 
an erroneous determination of the foreign party’s claims. Consider, 
for example, two leading cases under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s Chapter 11,84 which permits private entities to file claims 
against the signatory countries for treating the plaintiff’s investments 
in ways that violate international standards85: Mondev International 
Ltd. v. United States86 and Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States.87 
In the Mondev case, a Canadian corporation contracted with the 
City of Boston and the Boston Redevelopment authority to build a 
shopping mall, parking garage, and hotel in Boston’s infamous 
“Combat Zone.”88 When the deal fell through, Mondev sued the City 
and the Authority for breach of contract and tortious interference 
with contractual relations in state court.89 Mondev prevailed before a 
jury, but the trial judge entered a JNOV on the ground that the 
defendants were immune from suit under Massachusetts law.90 The 
 
 83. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 15, at 12 (citing Bush v. Gore as an example of the Supreme 
Court’s disrespect for state courts). 
 84. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 
605 (1993). 
 85. See generally Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1170 (2005) (discussing examples of arbitration proceedings under Chapter 
11 of NAFTA). 
 86. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S. (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 42 I.L.M. 85 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002). 
 87. Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003). 
 88. Lafayette Place Assocs. V. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 649 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Mass. 
1998). 
 89. Id. at 824–25. 
 90. Id. at 836–37. 
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Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding not 
only that the defendants were immune, but also that the trial court 
had erred in finding breach in the first place.91 
Mondev then turned to Chapter 11 arbitration under the 
NAFTA.92 As the NAFTA tribunal construed it, Mondev’s claim was 
“that by the decisions of its courts, the United States effectively 
expropriated the value of the rights to redress arising from the failure 
of the project.”93 Mondev argued that the outcome of its lawsuit 
amounted to a “denial of justice” under international law, a principle 
that implicates both “improper procedures and unjust decisions.”94 As 
a leading treatise explains, the denial of justice principle “recognizes 
that not only flagrant procedural irregularities and deficiencies may 
justify diplomatic complaint, but also gross defects in the substance of 
the judgment itself.”95 In effect, such claims rely upon “the substantive 
injustice as indirect evidence of partiality . . . in the tribunal.”96 The 
upshot is a principle that by misconstruing its own domestic law, a 
domestic court may violate international law as well. 
The Loewen case presented a similar effort to collaterally attack a 
state-court construction of state law in an international tribunal.97 
Loewen involved a business tort dispute between a local funeral home 
chain in Mississippi and a larger Canadian mortuary conglomerate.98 
After a Mississippi state-court trial in which the plaintiffs repeatedly 
appealed to patriotism and antiforeign sentiment, a jury awarded the 
local plaintiffs $500 million, including $75 million for emotional 
distress and $400 million in punitive damages.99 Because Mississippi 
law required appellants to post an appeal bond equal to 125 percent 
of the judgment, the Loewen Group eschewed an appeal on the 
 
 91. Id. For further background, see Dana Krueger, Note, The Combat Zone: Mondev Int’l, 
Ltd. v. United States and the Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 399 
(2003) (suggesting that the American victory in Mondev was “a hollow victory primarily based 
on technical grounds”). 
 92. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S. (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 42 I.L.M. 85 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002) ¶ 23. 
 93. Id. ¶ 59. 
 94. René Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice 
System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 251 (2001). 
 95. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL 
OF JUSTICE 309 (1938). 
 96. Lerner, supra note 94, at 262. 
 97. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003). 
 98. Id. ¶ 3. 
 99. Id. ¶ 4. 
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merits and ultimately settled the case for $175 million.100 It then filed a 
NAFTA claim, arguing both that the procedural deficiencies of the 
Mississippi proceedings and the substance of the state courts’ rulings 
violated international law.101 
The United States ultimately escaped liability in both Mondev and 
Loewen. Both arbitral panels insisted that they were not conducting 
an appellate review of the state courts’ judgments—and then 
proceeded to conduct such a review. The Mondev panel engaged in 
searching review of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
reasoning on the contract claim before determining that there had 
been no denial of justice.102 The Loewen panel, on the other hand, 
actually did find that “the conduct of the trial by the trial judge was so 
flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting to a 
manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international 
law”;103 it determined that Loewen’s claim was barred, however, by its 
failure to pursue local remedies and a jurisdictional problem arising 
from a change in Loewen’s national identity during the course of the 
litigation.104 Despite these different outcomes, however, what is 
striking about both Mondev and Loewen was the degree to which 
supranational tribunals were willing to second-guess state courts on 
matters plainly within their purview—the construction of state law 
and the conduct of trials on state claims. Although we have yet to see 
a massive wave of similar international challenges to domestic-court 
judgments under the “denial of justice” principle, informed observers 
have suggested that such claims “are likely to proliferate” in the 
future.105 
Denial of justice claims are structurally similar to judicial takings 
claims in that both begin with an allegation that a particular court—in 
the former case, any domestic court—misconstrued its own law, then 
 
 100. Id. ¶ 7. 
 101. Id. ¶ 39. 
 102. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S. (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 42 I.L.M. 85 
¶¶ 129–38 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002). 
 103. Loewen, 42 I.L.M. 811 ¶ 54. 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 149, 225, 240. See also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: 
International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (2004) (noting that the 
“technical and . . . perhaps fortuitous nature” of the grounds of dismissal “offers little reason to 
believe that liability for U.S. judicial conduct will not be imposed in the future”). 
 105. Ahdieh, supra note 104, at 2141; see also William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: 
Trials and Errors under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 575 (2002) 
(explaining that “domestic court review . . . is likely to be most attractive to those foreign 
investors with the weakest claims”). 
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transform that allegation into a potential violation of another kind of 
law. Denial of justice claims thus allow supranational courts to review 
the decisions of domestic courts on domestic law; judicial takings 
claims similarly permit federal courts to review the decisions of state 
courts on state law. In each case, there is little reason to expect that 
the reviewing court will have a better chance of getting the law right 
than the court that considered the question in the first instance. 
Additionally, because denial of justice claims proceed as a form of 
collateral review, they multiply the potential for delay and 
proliferation of litigation costs that a simple appeal from the state 
courts to the U.S. Supreme Court would present. Depending on the 
remedies available for judicial takings—a difficult question that we 
touch on only briefly in this article—takings claims may pose a similar 
risk. 
A final analogy may pose a helpful perspective on the scope of the 
intrusion on state courts that a robust judicial takings doctrine would 
represent. Supreme Court review of state-court decisions has always 
been a limited check on errors and bias; a single appellate tribunal 
simply cannot hope to police fifty state courts, especially when it is 
also responsible for overseeing thirteen busy and often fractious 
federal circuit courts.106 The more important federal judicial constraint 
on the state courts is the system of collateral review of state-court 
proceedings by federal writs of habeas corpus. This system effectively 
allows the lower federal courts to stand in for Supreme Court direct 
review to ensure that state courts are respecting federal rights.107 
Unlike the sporadic and aberrational Supreme Court review of state 
questions antecedent to federal rights or the nascent system of denial 
of justice review by supranational tribunals, the habeas system is well-
developed. 
Four points about the habeas system are critical for present 
purposes. First, it arose by deliberate legislative choice in response to 
specific and compelling historical circumstances. During 
 
 106. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335 (2002) (noting a dramatic decline in the number of state 
supreme court cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari). 
 107. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that habeas petitioners may 
relitigate claims that their convictions violated federal rights, even though those claims were 
fully and fairly litigated in the state courts); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 1229–30 
(discussing the view that “habeas jurisdiction, though not technically appellate review by district 
courts, serves as a substitute for Supreme Court review to ensure that federal constitutional 
claims are heard by a federal court”). 
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Reconstruction, Congress for the first time established the federal 
courts as the primary guarantors of federal rights by enlarging those 
courts’ jurisdiction over federal claims, providing new remedies for 
individuals whose rights had been violated by state officials, and 
extending the federal habeas remedy to persons in state custody.108 
Contemporary concerns about judicial takings among property rights 
advocates, however, have not persuaded Congress to authorize 
specific federal remedies or to constrain the common-law powers of 
state courts. 
Second, federal habeas corpus review of state-court proceedings is 
confined to a particular subject matter (criminal procedural rights) 
that was deemed to present a unique concern about state respect for 
federal rights. However compelling a judicial takings claim may be in 
particular instances, we are unaware of any general concern that the 
states have been insufficiently solicitous of property rights, much less 
that the state courts are inadequate fora for protecting those rights. If 
anything, the widespread state efforts to constrain takings in the wake 
of Kelo v. City of New London109 suggest that concern for property 
rights is alive and well in the states.110 
Third, the habeas system generally does not review the state 
courts’ construction of their own law; review is confined to state-court 
compliance with federal norms that are distinct, substantively 
speaking, from the state-law questions arising in criminal cases. 
Hence, federal habeas courts do not consider whether state courts 
have correctly construed their criminal statutes. Federal courts have 
even eschewed any general license to inquire into whether the 
individual petitioner was properly found guilty under those statutes—
that is, habeas law generally considers the actual guilt or innocence of 
the defendant to be a state-law question outside the scope of habeas 
review.111 
 
 
 108. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (extending the federal writ of habeas corpus 
to prisoners in state custody); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 45, at 1220–23 (discussing the 
history of the habeas extension). 
 109. Kelo v. City of London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (permitting governments to use their 
eminent domain powers to take private property for the purpose of economic development). 
 110. See, e.g., Rhode Island Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 108 (R.I. 2006) 
(holding that a parking garage seized for use as airport parking was not for a public use or 
purpose). 
 111. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (holding that a criminal defendant must 
have a constitutional claim independent of an assertion of his innocence in order to be entitled 
to habeas review). 
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Finally, federal habeas review is pervasively constrained by norms 
of deference—both statutory and judge-made—to state courts. State 
courts’ findings of fact must be treated as presumptively correct, and 
even state courts’ decisions of mixed questions of fact and (federal) 
law must be accorded deference on collateral attack in federal 
court.112 Numerous other procedural limitations, such as strict rules of 
exhaustion and procedural default,113 insist on respect for the primary 
role of the state courts in criminal cases. 
The structure of the habeas regime demonstrates that even in an 
area of particular historical mistrust of state courts—where collateral 
review of state-court judgments is explicitly authorized by statute—
both Congress and the federal judiciary have respected the autonomy 
of state courts and tailored their interventions to avoid federal review 
of state constructions of state law. It would be odd indeed if, without 
any prompting from Congress or evidence that state courts have 
frequently changed state property rights in ways detrimental to 
rightholders, the federal courts were to fashion a more intrusive 
regime of federal review for judicial takings. 
III. FEDERAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL TAKINGS 
The analysis is somewhat different for alleged judicial takings 
involving federal property rights. Here, the paradigm case is patent 
law: federal law creates property rights in patents, and those rights are 
(pretty much) exclusively interpreted by the federal courts.114 Hence, a 
 
 112. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2011) (precluding habeas relief unless the state-court 
decision was either (i) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law or 
(ii) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383–84 (2000) (holding that state-
court decisions on mixed questions are entitled to some degree of deference). 
 113. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)–(c) (West 2011) (codifying the exhaustion doctrine); see 
generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (procedural default). 
 114. We say “pretty much” because patent issues can still arise in state courts in certain 
circumstances. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), for 
example, involved a dispute between the maker of one device and a competitor, who made a 
similar device and owned a patent on that device. Id. at 258. The competitor alleged to potential 
customers that the first device infringed the competitor’s patent, but did not actually sue for 
patent infringement. Id. Instead, the maker of the first device sued the competitor for libel 
under state law. Id. This suit was held to arise under state law, notwithstanding the fact that the 
key issue litigated in the case would be the question of infringement as an element of the 
competitor’s truth defense to the libel claim. Id. at 259–60. This case is the original source of the 
“Holmes Rule” for federal question jurisdiction, which is that a case ordinarily arises under the 
law that creates the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. at 260; see generally HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 45. As American Well Works illustrates, the jurisdictional statutes have gaps that 
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Federal Circuit decision that departed significantly from prior law in a 
way that diminished a patent holder’s rights might well raise similar 
judicial takings issues to the state-court scenarios that we have been 
discussing. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in a recent decision, 
Fundamental alterations in [patent] rules risk destroying the 
legitimate expectations of inventors in their property. . . . “To 
change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well 
subvert the various balances the [Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO)] sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which 
have not yet expired . . . .”115 
As one of our former students has argued in an excellent note, “when 
the Federal Circuit makes a fundamental change in the law that 
dramatically departs from settled precedent, that change should raise 
questions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”116 
Without a doubt, a federal judicial decision concerning a federal 
right may undermine people’s expectations about the existence or 
value of their property in much the same way that a state-court 
construction of property law can. Indeed, we can think of several 
instances in recent years where the federal courts have changed 
course in a way that disrupted expectations and narrowed the subject 
matter or scope of intellectual property rights. In the trademark area, 
the Supreme Court swung broadly in favor of protecting trade dress 
through the mid-1990s, but thought better of its largesse and scaled 
back on such protection just a few years later.117 In patent law, the 
Court disrupted decades of settled practice by abandoning the 
presumption in favor of injunctive relief against infringers.118 In none 
of these cases did the Court acknowledge changing course; it 
 
allow patent issues to be litigated in the state courts from time to time. 
 115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) 
(quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997)). 
 116. J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1747, 1749 (2005). 
 117. Compare Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (“We see no 
basis for requiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress protection under § 
43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols, or devices capable of identifying a producer's 
product.”), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (treating 
product design trade dress as incapable of being protected without secondary meaning); see also 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (denying trademark 
protection to features that are part of what make products work, despite years of case law 
recognizing such protection). 
 118. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (requiring a plaintiff 
seeking an injunction to show irreparable harm, no other adequate compensation, that an 
injunction is warranted, and that ordering such would not be contrary to public policy). 
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distinguished its earlier decisions and purported to be acting 
consistent with them. In both the patent and trademark context, 
however, the intellectual property claimants could make a strong 
showing that prior case law gave them reason to have confidence in 
the existence and scope of their rights. 
The prospect that judicial decisions like these could be classified 
as takings reinforces our worry about a broad, expectations-based 
judicial takings doctrine. If a federal court ran the risk of “taking” 
property each time it recognized a new limitation on intellectual 
property rights, judges might hesitate to adopt such limits, even when 
they would best serve the interests of the intellectual property system 
and the public. Any such risk aversion, moreover, would always work 
in one direction: to deter judicial innovations that limit intellectual 
property rights, rather than the other way around. 
In any event, because of structural considerations judicial takings 
are likely to play a less significant role in the context of intellectual 
property or other federal law. A state court can change state property 
law because it is endowed with common-law authority to make the 
law of the state; this is the source of its authority to take actions that 
may trigger an obligation of just compensation under the Takings 
Clause. Federal courts, on the other hand, generally lack that power.119 
So-called “federal common law” is most often either a somewhat 
more open-ended form of statutory interpretation or interstitial gap 
filling that is itself unlikely to radically change property rights in a 
way sufficient to effect a taking.120 The federal judicial decisions that 
people usually point to as raising takings questions—e.g., patent 
cases—usually involve changes in the way that federal courts 
interpret important federal statutes. 
When they interpret federal statutes, federal courts are supposed 
to follow the intent of the enacting Congress. Of course there is 
ambiguity in many federal statutes, and of course the way that courts 
respond to such ambiguity may change over time. But in principle—
and it is an important principle—federal courts simply lack the power 
to change federal statutes. That principle is reflected in the nearly 
 
 119. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that “[t]here is no 
federal general common law”). 
 120. To the extent that federal common law may go further, one of us would be inclined to 
say that it is unconstitutional. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1679 (2008) (arguing the importance of restricting the scope of 
federal common law in order to maintain the divisions inherent in the federalist system). 
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absolute rule of stare decisis that the Supreme Court has adopted for 
statutory construction decisions.121 This means that if the Federal 
Circuit substantially departs from the prior meaning of the patent 
statute, that decision is wrong and should be reversed—but it is not a 
“taking.” Takings law assumes that the relevant government actor 
actually possesses the authority to change the law, so long as it 
compensates injured property holders, and that is a power that federal 
courts simply lack. 
We recognize that the interstices in intellectual property statutes 
can be substantial, leaving courts to make important substantive 
decisions in intellectual property cases. In some other areas of federal 
law, too, courts may have been delegated—or at least think they have 
been delegated—common-law powers by Congress. Admiralty is the 
classic example,122 although one of us is pretty sure that the common 
lawmaking power exercised by federal admiralty courts is 
unconstitutional,123 and in any event federal maritime law is largely a 
creature of statute nowadays. To the extent that Congress can and has 
validly delegated lawmaking authority to the federal courts, judicial 
decisions in intellectual property cases raise issues identical to the 
state property cases discussed above. If takings analysis is to apply at 
all to such cases, we think it important to limit it to cases involving 
clear, acknowledged changes in the law, resulting in a transfer of a 
property right from a private property owner to the government. But 
we think these circumstances are extremely rare, if they exist at all. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On its face, the Takings Clause does not distinguish between 
judges, legislatures, and executive actors, which makes the notion of 
judicial takings superficially appealing. A robust judicial takings 
doctrine, however, would radically transform the way that state courts 
go about the business of deciding disputes and thereby shaping the 
common law. Even a relatively deferential approach to judicial 
takings would inevitably embroil federal courts in disputes over the 
 
 121. See Ill. Brick co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (“[W]e must bear in mind that 
considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where 
Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”). 
 122. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (“Admiralty 
law is judge-made law to a great extent.”). 
 123. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 276–77 (1999) 
(arguing that broad federal common-law powers in admiralty cases are inconsistent with 
modern preemption law and the core precepts of federalism). 
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meaning of substantive state law. In our view, history, prudence, and 
federalism concerns all argue against recognizing judicial takings, 
unless the state court actually acknowledges that it is substantially 
changing the preexisting law in a way that burdens property owners 
for the benefit of the general public. In effect, this standard would 
treat courts the same as legislatures and executive officials when they 
self-consciously change the law, but bar takings claims that are, in 
reality, simply collateral attacks on an alleged error in interpreting 
state law. Except in unusual situations, judicial takings should remain 
the stuff of law review articles and plurality opinions, rather than the 
law of the land. 
 
